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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CPRL 3213: Where neither party objects, and the court has jurisdic-
tion, any procedural device may be used in the course of a trial to
effectuate justice.
In Reilly v. Insurance Company of North America,145 an action
commenced under CPLR 3218 as a motion for summary judgment in
lieu of complaint, the Appellate Division, First Department, held that
neither party had put forth sufficient information in its affidavit for
the court to grant summary relief.
The sole issue remaining in contention was whether the word
"dollars," as it appeared in a group accident policy, meant American
or Canadian dollars. Plaintiff's affidavit did not set forth the evidence
necessary to determine this question, and thus, since an issue of fact
remained for trial, the affidavit did not meet the standard of a "claim
presumptively meritorious."'146 Plaintiff's motion was therefore properly
denied.
However, the fact that the defendant sought to avail itself of the
summary judgment procedure which, under the express language of
CPLR 3213147 is applicable solely to the plaintiff, does make the case
worthy of note. As Justice Steuer observed in his dissent, since the
procedure was acquiesced in by both parties, the application should have
been treated as "a motion and cross-motion for summary judgment
with the affidavits serving both as pleadings and supporting the evi-
dentiary contentions of the parties."' 48 Both the dissent and the ma-
jority recognized that any procedural device may be used in litigation
so long as all of the parties to the controversy acquiesce in the deviation
from the statutory norm. In the absence of an express statutory pro-
hibition, litigants should remain free to chart their own procedural
course through the courts.
CPLR 3216: Cohn v. Borchard Affiliations reversed by Court of
Appeals.
The spectre of the unconstitutionality of CPLR 3216 and other
CPLR provisions has been laid to rest by the Court of Appeals' unani-
145 32 App. Div. 2d 918, 802 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1st Dep't 1969).
146 See Frosr REP. 91.
147 CPLR 3213 provides, inter alia:
When an action is based upon an instrument for the payment of money only ...
the plaintiff may serve with the summons a notice of motion for summary judg-
ment and the supporting papers in lieu of a complaint....
148 32 App. Div. 2d at 919, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
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mous reversal of the appellate decision in Cohn v. Borchard Affilia-
tions:149
[T]he Appellate Division's decision invalidating [CPLR 32161 not
only goes counter to the language and the history of this State's
Constitution but also throws into doubt a number of other portions
of the carefully formulated CPLR. Recognizing, as we must, that
the statute - whatever we may think of the policy it expresses -
constitutes a valid exercise of the legislative power, the necessity to
reverse is clear.150
Rule 3216 and its predecessors stirred considerable controversy
between the legislature and the judiciary."". Thus, it was the intent
of the legislature to preclude the possibility of any future construction
problems when it reenacted the rule in 1967. And Chief Judge Fuld's
opinion in the Cohn reversal serves as proof that the legislature has
been successful in this regard. 52 The Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment, had declared the rule to be unconstitutional in part in Cohn
because it deprived the courts of their inherent power to control their
calendars.153 In so doing, however, that court cited no specific provi-
sion of the state constitution in support of its conclusion.
149 25 N.Y.2d 237, 250 N.E.2d 690, 303 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1969), rev'g 30 App. Div. 2d 74,
289 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1st Dep't 1968). For a detailed discussion of the appellate division hold-
ing see 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 336-43 (1968). See also The Quar-
terly Survey, 44 ST. JorN's L. RiEv. 135, 151-53 (1969); The Quarterly Survey, 43 ST. JoHN's
L. R.v. 302, 330-31 (1968).
190 25 N.Y.2d at 252, 250 N.E.2d at 697, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
151 Rule 3216, as it originally appeared, was merely a reenactment of CPA 181. It
was first amended in 1964 as a result of the legislative reaction to Sortino v Fisher, 20
App. Div. 2d 25, 245 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1st Dep't 1963) (introduction of rigid court standards
meant to insure dismissal of all cases which were unreasonably delayed). See generally 7B
MCKINNEY's CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 336, 349-53 (1964); 4 WK&-M 3216.04,
3216.04a (1969); The Biannual Survey, 38 ST. JOHN's L. Rv. 406, 448-52 (1964).
The 1967 amendment was occasioned by the Court of Appeals holding in Thomas v.
Melbert Foods, 19 N.Y.2d 216, 225 N.E.2d 584, 278 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1967). In Thomas the
Court held that where the basis for the motion to dismiss was "general delay," the 1964
amendment embodying the 45-day demand procedure was inapplicable; it was relevant
only to a 3216 motion based upon plaintiff's failure to file a note of issue. Thus in
Thomas, the Court of Appeals effectively emasculated the 1964 amendment. As amended
in 1967, 3216 clearly establishes the requirements for a motion to dismiss-issue must be
joined, one year must elapse from the joinder of issue, a 45-day demand must be served
upon the party asserting the claim and a default in compliance with that demand must
occur. Only after all three of these conditions precedent have been met, whether the
motion is based upon want of prosecution ("general delay') or failure to serve and file a
note of issue, may the defendant move to dismiss. See generally 73 McKINNEY's CPLR
3216, supp. commentary 335, 343-48 (1967); 4 WK&M 3216.01, 5216.02, 3216.04a (1968).
152 25 N.Y.2d at 246, 250 N.E.2d at 694, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 638:
As it now reads, the statute permits of no doubt as to its meaning: no motion to
dismiss for failure to prosecute, brought prior to the filing of a note of issue, may
be made unless the defendant has first served the plaintiff with a demand that
he file a note of issue.
15S It should be noted that the second and fourth departments have upheld the rule's
constitutionality. See Foigy v. Penn Aluminum Inrc, 31 App. Div. 2d 783, 296 N.YS.Sd
1970]
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On the other hand, the Court of Appeals based its finding of con-
stitutionality upon the mandate of article VI, section 30 of the con-
Stitution.154 "[T]he language of the Constitution leaves little room for
doubt that the authority to regulate practice and procedure in the
courts lies principally with the Legislature,"' 55 since the procedure of
dismissing complaints for undue delay was legislatively created and
did not arise from the inherent power of the court. 50
The Court has thus put to rest any questions as to the constitu-
tionality of a rule designed to insure that a plaintiff be given every
possible opportunity to prosecute a meritorious claim. Although the
courts and several authorities may be displeased with the result,lr3 the
only way to effectuate any desired reform is through constitutional
amendment, and this course does not appear likely.
ARTICLE 34- CALENDAR PRACTICE; TRiAL PREFERENCES
CPLR 3403: Special preference denied Seider-based plaintiff.
In denying an application for a special preference under CPLR
3403, in Tjepkema v. Kenney, 58 Justice Gold pointed out another in
the myriad of problems generated by Seider-based 5 9 attachments of
insurance policy proceeds. The action was brought against the non-
resident defendant to recover damages for the wrongful death of a
New York decedent in an out-of-state automobile accident. Quasi in
rem jurisdiction was predicated upon the attachment of the defendant's
liability insurance policy through his insurance company's New York
office. This fact pattern, of course, precisely parallels that which existed
in Seider.
1019 (4th Dep't 1969); Kull v. City of New York, 31 App. Div. 2d 638, 295 N.Y.S.2d 959
(2d Dep't 1968); Johnson v. Parrow, 56 Misc. 2d 863, 291 N.Y.S.2d 175 (Sup. Ct. Ontario
County 1968). For a discussion of the reaction of the third department to Cohn, see The
Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 135, 151-53 (1969).
154 N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 30:
The legislature shall have the same power to alter and regulate the jurisdiction
and proceedings in law and equity that it has heretofore exercised. The legis-
lature may ... delegate . . .any power possessed by [it] .. . to regulate practice
and procedure in the courts.
See Johnson v. Parrow, 56 Misc. 2d 863, 291 N.Y.S.2d 175 (Sup. Ct. Ontario County 1968),
where this section of the constitution was first cited in support of the validity of CPLR
3216. See also The Quarterly Survey, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. Rzv. 498, 517-18 (1969).
155 25 N.Y.2d at 247, 250 N.E.2d at 695, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
156 Id. at 298-99, 250 N.E.2d at 695-96, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 640-41. See also 7B MCKINNEY'S
CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 336, 339, 345 (1967-68).
157 See, e.g., 25 N.Y.2d at 251, 250 N.E.2d at 697, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 643; 7B MCKINNEY'S
CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 336, 339 (1968).
158 59 Misc. 2d 670, 299 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
159 See Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). See also
Note, Seider v. Roth: The Constitutional Phase, 43 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 58 (1968).
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